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Research Article
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Abstract | In 1633, the Inquisition condemned Galileo for defending Copernicus’s hypothesis of
the earth’s motion and denying the scientific authority of Scripture. This ended the original controversy, but generated a new one that continues today, for example, about whether the condemnation
proves the incompatibility between science and religion. Recently the Galileo affair has been studied
by several scholars whom I label “Berkeley para-clericals,” chiefly philosopher Paul Feyerabend and
historian John Heilbron. Their approach is distinctive: it views controversial topics involving the relationship between science and religion from a perspective that is secular-minded, but appreciative
of religion, and yet conducted in the belief that such topics are too important to leave to religious
believers. This approach also characterizes the work of other Berkeley para-clericals, such as Ronald
Numbers on the controversy over creationism and evolutionism; they stress such attitudes as impartiality, judiciousness, and even-handedness.
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Introduction

T

he main aim of this essay is to call attention to
the existence of a distinctive approach to the
study of the Galileo affair, and more generally to
questions of science vs. religion. Such an approach
can be detected in the works of philosopher Paul
Feyerabend and historian John Heilbron. I shall argue that, despite the many other differences between
Feyerabend and Heilbron, they both approach the affair with a perspective which is secular-minded, but
appreciative of religion, and yet conducted in the belief that the affair is one of those topics that are too
important to leave to religious believers. I label such
an approach the “Berkeley para-clerical” approach because it is practiced not only by these two luminaries
of the University of California, Berkeley, but also by
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other scholars who are graduates of the same institution. One of these is the distinguished historian Ronald Numbers, who has studied the controversy over
evolution and creationism. The analysis of the work
of these other scholars leads us to a deeper understanding of this para-clerical approach in terms of a
family of notions such as impartiality, judiciousness,
objectivity, non-partisanship, even-handedness, and
balanced judgment.

A Summary of the Galileo Affair
It will be useful to begin with a succinct summary of
the Galileo affair.1 In 1543, Copernicus published an
epoch-making book, On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres. In it, he advanced an argument in favor of
the idea that the earth rotates daily on its axis and re-

volves yearly around the sun. The argument amounted
to showing that the known facts about the motion of
heavenly bodies could be explained better on the basis
of the heliocentric geokinetic hypothesis than on the
basis of Ptolemy’s geocentric geostatic theory.
Although novel and significant, Copernicus’s argument was hypothetical and inconclusive. Moreover,
there were many arguments against the earth’s motion, stemming from astronomical observation, Aristotelian physics, traditional epistemology, and scriptural interpretation. These objections were advanced
by astronomers, mathematicians, and natural philosophers, as well as theologians and churchmen, and by
Protestants as well as Catholics. They can be summarized as follows.
The earth’s motion seemed philosophically and epistemologically absurd because it contradicted direct
sense experience; in fact, neither Copernicus nor anyone else could see, feel, or otherwise perceive the
earth’s motion. From the perspective of the science of
motion, the motion of the earth seems physically impossible because the available laws of motion (stemming from Aristotle) implied that bodies on a rotating earth would, for example, follow a slanted rather
than vertical path in free fall, and would be thrown
off by centrifugal force. From the point of view of astronomy, the earth’s motion seemed to be empirically
false because it had consequences that could not be
observed; for example, terrestrial and heavenly bodies would have to have similar physical properties;
the planet Venus would have to exhibit phases similar
to those of the moon; and the fixed stars would have
to undergo a yearly shift in their apparent position,
called annual stellar parallax. Finally, the earth’s motion seemed theologically heretical because it contradicted the words and the traditional interpretations
of Scripture, such as the passage in Joshua 10:12-13.
Thus, Copernicanism attracted few followers. Galileo
himself, in the first twenty years of his career (15891609), was not one of them. His stance toward Copernicanism then was one of indirect pursuit, an attitude
that is not only weaker than acceptance, but also weaker than direct pursuit: his research focused on physics
rather than astronomy; he was critical of Aristotelian
physics and favorably inclined toward an Archimedean approach; he had intuited that the Copernican
hypothesis of the earth’s motion was more consistent
with the new science of motion he was developing
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than was the geostatic theory; but at that time he felt
that, overall, the arguments against Copernicanism
were stronger than those in favor of it.
However, in 1609-1610, by means of the newly invented telescope, Galileo made several startling discoveries, which he immediately published in a book
entitled The Sidereal Messenger: that the moon’s surface is rough, full of mountains and valleys; that innumerable other stars exist besides those visible with
the naked eye; that the Milky Way and what had been
traditionally called nebulas are dense collections of
large numbers of individual stars; and that the planet
Jupiter has four moons revolving around it at different
distances and with different periods. Soon thereafter,
he also discovered the phases of Venus and sunspots;
and in 1613, he published a book On Sunspots.
The new telescopic evidence removed most of the
observational-astronomical objections against the
earth’s motion and added new evidence in its favor.
Galileo now believed not only that the geokinetic
theory had greater explanatory coherence than the
geostatic theory (as Copernicus had shown); not only
that it was physically and mechanically more adequate (as Galileo’s new physics suggested); but also
that it was empirically and observationally more accurate in astronomy (as the telescope now revealed). His
assessment was now that the arguments and evidence
for the earth’s motion were collectively stronger than
those for the earth being at rest; in other words, that
Copernicanism was more likely to be true than the
geostatic world view. However, he realized that this
strengthening of Copernicanism was not equivalent
to settling the issue, because there was still some astronomical counter-evidence (mainly, the lack of annual stellar parallax); because the physical objections
had not yet been explicitly refuted and the physics of a
moving earth had not yet been published; and because
the scriptural objection had not yet been answered.
Besides realizing that the pro-Copernican arguments
were still not absolutely conclusive, Galileo must have
also perceived the potentially explosive character of
the scriptural objection. In fact, for a number of years
he did not get involved despite the fact that his Sidereal Messenger had been attacked by several authors on
biblical grounds, among others. Eventually, however,
he was dragged into the theological discussion. He
was careful enough not to publish his criticism of the
scriptural objection, but to circulate it privately, in the

form of letters. The first one, in 1613, was addressed
to his former student Benedetto Castelli, professor of
mathematics at the University of Pisa, while a more
elaborate version, in 1615, was addressed to the Grand
Duchess Christina, mother of Cosimo II de’ Medici,
grand duke of Tuscany.
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For the next several years, Galileo behaved as if he
was bound by Bellarmine’s warning, but as if he had
no knowledge of the special injunction. That is, he
refrained from supporting or defending the earth’s
motion, although he discussed it incidentally in the
context of a controversy over comets. The situation
changed in 1623, when an admirer of Galileo, CardiGalileo’s criticism, although complex and liable to mis- nal Maffeo Barberini, became Pope Urban VIII. From
understanding, was logically compelling, rhetorically several indications, Galileo came to the conclusion
persuasive, and theologically sophisticated. And in this that if he exercised the proper care, he could publish a
context, it should be stressed that his efforts were par- book on the dangerous topic.
allel and complementary with those of other progressive Catholic theologians and philosophers, such as Thus, in 1632, Galileo published a work entitled DiPaolo Antonio Foscarini and Tommaso Campanella. alogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and
Copernican. The book was obviously a discussion of
However, despite winning this intellectual argument, the earth’s motion, but the discussion took the form
Galileo lost the practical struggle. In 1615, after some of a critical examination of all the arguments for and
formal complaints were filed against him, the Inquisi- against the idea; the arguments on both sides were
tion launched an investigation. The proceedings lasted presented, analyzed, and evaluated. He tried his best
about a year, and the results were the following. In to carry out his evaluation fairly and validly. The ar1616, the Congregation of the Index issued a decree guments for the earth’s motion turned out to be much
declaring that the doctrine of the earth’s motion was better than those against it. This was at worst an imphysically false and contrary to Scripture; it also con- plicit defense of Copernicanism.
demned and permanently banned Foscarini’s book
entitled Letter on the Pythagorean Opinion (1615), Galileo’s hope and gamble was that friendly Church
which had argued that the earth’s motion was proba- officials would not blame him for this; that they would
ble and not contrary to Scripture; and it temporarily recognize that the defense was not explicit; and that
prohibited Copernicus’s book On the Revolutions, un- therefore they would judge that he had acted within
til and unless it was revised. Although Galileo was not the spirit of Bellarmine’s warning. Galileo’s attempt
mentioned at all in the decree, in private he was given misfired not because it was foolhardy or unreasonable,
a warning.
but because in 1632 the special injunction came to the
surface, and from its point of view any discussion of
This warning exists in two versions. One is written on the earth’s motion by Galileo was prohibited, whether
a certificate given to Galileo and signed by Cardinal or not it amounted to a defense. Thus, in the fall of
Robert Bellarmine, who was an authoritative member that year he was summoned to Rome to face the Inof both the Congregations of the Index and of the In- quisition.
quisition; it states that Bellarmine informed Galileo
that, in light of the Index’s decree, the earth’s motion The proceedings did not begin until April. At the first
could not be held or defended. The second version is in hearing, Galileo was asked about the events of 1616
an unsigned note written by a notary and found in the and the Dialogue of 1632. He admitted receiving from
file of Inquisition trial proceedings; it states that the Bellarmine the warning that the earth’s motion could
commissary general of the Inquisition gave Galileo not be held or defended, but only discussed hypothetthe special injunction not to hold, defend, or discuss ically. He denied receiving a special injunction not to
in any way the earth’s motion. The difference between discuss the topic in any way whatever, and in his deBellarmine’s friendly warning and the commissary’s fense he introduced the certificate he had obtained
special injunction is that the latter adds a more strin- from Bellarmine in 1616 which only mentioned the
gent prohibition to the one mentioned in the former: prohibition to hold or defend. Galileo also claimed
besides being prohibited, like other Catholics, to hold that the book did not really defend the earth’s motion,
and defend the Copernican opinion, Galileo in addi- but rather suggested that the favorable arguments
tion was specially forbidden to discuss it in any way were inconclusive, and so did not violate Bellarmine’s
whatever.
warning.
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The special injunction must have surprised Galileo as
much as Bellarmine’s certificate surprised the inquisitors. In fact, it took three weeks before they decided on
the next step. The inquisitors opted for what might be
called out-of-court plea-bargaining: they would not
press the most serious but most questionable charge
(namely, violation of the special injunction), but Galileo would have to plead guilty to a lesser and more
provable charge (namely, transgression of the warning
not to defend Copernicanism). He decided to cooperate, but requested a few days to devise a dignified way
of pleading guilty to the lesser charge.
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highlight the actions taken by the Church. In 1740 to
1758, Pope Benedict XIV allowed the partial unbanning of Galileo’s Dialogue and of Copernican books
in general. In 1820 to 1835, there was a total repeal of
the prohibition of the Copernican doctrine. In 1893,
Pope Leo XIII published an encyclical containing
an implicit theological vindication of Galileo’s biblical hermeneutics, although his name was not even
mentioned. In 1942, during the commemoration of
the tricentennial of Galileo’s death, several Church
officials started publicizing an appreciation of Galileo-the-person, as a model of harmony between
science and religion. And in 1979-1992, Pope (now
Thus, at later hearings, he stated that the first deposition Saint) John Paul II undertook a further “rehabilitahad prompted him to re-read his book. He was sur- tion”3 of Galileo.
prised to find that it gave readers the impression that the
author was defending the earth’s motion, even though The critical issues of the subsequent controversy in
this had not been his intention. He attributed his error part reflect the original issues. However, the subseto wanting to appear clever by making the weaker side quent controversy has also acquired a life of its own,
look stronger. He was sorry and ready to make amends. with debates over new issues, such as whether the
condemnation of Galileo illustrates the incompatibilThe trial ended on 22 June 1633 with a harsher sen- ity between science and religion. Indeed, traditionally
tence than Galileo had been led to believe. The ver- this condemnation has been viewed as epitomizing
dict found him guilty of a category of religious crime such a conflict. Here, it is important to note that this
intermediate between the most and the least serious, view has been advanced not only by relatively injucalled “vehement suspicion of heresy”; the suspicious- dicious authors such as Draper (1875) and ƒWhite
ly heretical beliefs were the cosmological thesis that (1896), who have recently been widely discredited (cf.
the earth moves and the methodological principle Brooke 1991; Lindberg and Numbers 1987), but also
that the Bible is not a scientific authority. Thus, he by such scientific, philosophical, and cultural icons as
was forced to recite a humiliating “abjuration.” And Einstein (1953), ´Russell ([1935] 1997), and Popper
the Dialogue was banned.
(1963).
The sentence also states that he was to be held in prison indefinitely. However, this particular penalty was
immediately commuted to house arrest. Accordingly,
for about one week he was confined to Villa Medici,
a sumptuous palace in Rome belonging to the Tuscan
grand duke. Then for about five months he was sent
to the residence of Siena’s archbishop, who was a good
friend of Galileo’s. Finally, in December 1633 he was
allowed to live in seclusion at his own villa in Arcetri,
near Florence.2

The reflective commentary on the original trial consists of countless interpretations and evaluations
advanced in the past four centuries by astronomers,
physicists, theologians, churchmen, historians, philosophers, cultural critics, playwrights, novelists, and
journalists.

Although distinct, these three principal aspects of the
subsequent affair are obviously interrelated. For example, much of the reflective commentary consists of
attempts to formulate or resolve one or more critical
While the Inquisition’s condemnation in 1633 ended issues, and such formulations often represent importhe original Galileo affair, it gave rise to a new one tant developments of the historical aftermath.
that continues to our own day. To begin to make sense
of it, I stress that the subsequent affair has three prin- In this essay, I shall focus on a particular development
cipal aspects: the historical aftermath; the critical is- in the very recent historical aftermath. This involves
primarily the accounts advanced by philosopher Paul
sues; and the reflective commentary.
Feyerabend and by historian John Heilbron. They
The historical aftermath consists of facts and events raise relatively novel issues in the ongoing subsequent
directly stemming from the trial. Here, we can just controversy.
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indeed rejected and criticized by Galileo. However,
it is in fact untenable. For this version of the princiLet us begin with the account advanced by Feyera- ple cannot survive the objections (which we moderns
bend (1985; 1987, 247-64; 1988, 129-38; 1993, 125- have inherited from Galileo) against teleological and
34). He portrays Galileo’s trial as involving a conflict anthropomorphic ways of thinking; such thinking rebetween two philosophical attitudes toward, and duces to arguing that something is true because it is
historical traditions about, the role of experts. That useful, beneficial, or good, and false because it is useis, Galileo allegedly advocated the uncritical accept- less, harmful, or bad.
ance by society of the views of experts, whereas the
Church advocated the evaluation by society of the However, whether untenable or not, Feyerabend’s acviews of experts in the light of human and social val- count is important, for at least two reasons, one histoues. Feyerabend extracts this principle from Cardinal riographical, the other cultural.
Bellarmine’s letter to Foscarini (cf. Finocchiaro 2014,
78-80). Moreover, he judges the principle favorably, Historiographically speaking, Feyerabend’s account
in the sense that “the Church would do well to revive may be appreciated as an updated and revised conthe balance and graceful wisdom of Bellarmine, just as flictual thesis about the relationship between science
scientists constantly gain strength from the opinions and religion.4 It was advanced in an essay with the
of … their own pushy patron saint Galileo” (Feyera- revealing title of “Galileo and the Tyranny of Truth”;
bend 1985, 164). More generally, Feyerabend claims and this essay was a contribution to a 1985 conferthat “the Church at the time of Galileo not only kept ence on “The Galileo Affair: A Meeting of Faith and
closer to reason as defined then and, in part, even now; Science,” sponsored by the Cracow Pontifical Acadit also considered the ethical and social consequences emy of Theology and the Vatican Astronomical Obof Galileo’s views. Its indictment of Galileo was ra- servatory (cf. Coyne, Heller, and Zycínski 1985). The
tional and only opportunism and a lack of perspective conference thus appears to have had an apologetic or
can demand a revision” (Feyerabend 1988, 129; 1993, pro-clerical aim, in the sense that it was meant to substantiate and elaborate Pope John Paul II’s harmony
125).
thesis regarding the relationship between science and
In my opinion, Feyerabend’s account is untenable. In religion; that is, the thesis that science and religion
part, it is not really supported by the texts to which are generally in harmony with one another, and that
he refers. However, the principal difficulty is that he in particular the Galileo affair really proves this harseems to commit a fallacy of equivocation. For the mony, rather than their incompatibility, as commonly
principle in question could mean either that social thought. Feyerabend did contribute an account which
and political leaders should evaluate the use of experts’ is in one sense apologetic and pro-clerical, but which
views in light of human and social values, or that sci- remains conflictual, and so is critical and anti-clerical
entists should evaluate the truth of each other’s views in another sense. This, of course, is the kind of irony
and iconoclasm at which Feyerabend was a master.
in light of human and social values.
Note that Feyerabend is reversing not the traditional
type of interpretation, but rather what may be called
the traditional evaluation. In fact, at the interpretive level, he sees a conflict between Galileo and the
Church. However, at the evaluative level, he is (in the
historical context) siding with the Church and against
Galileo, insofar as he thinks that the principle advocated by the Church was sounder than the one advanced by Galileo. At the same time, since the Church
in the meantime has herself switched sides, the result is that Feyerabend is upholding the past Church
against the present-day Church. The content and nature of Feyerabend’s evaluation became more obvious
Under the second interpretation, the principle was later, in the 1988 edition of his book Against Method,
Now under the first interpretation, Galileo did not reject the principle, but rather would have agreed with
it. Moreover, when Feyerabend attributes this principle to Bellarmine, the documentation is unclear and
unconvincing. In any case, in this regard, the difference between Galileo and Bellarmine was not one of
principle but of application. For example, they would
have disagreed on who the relevant experts were, in
particular whether theologians should be counted as
experts in physics and astronomy; another disagreement would have been whether the views of theological experts should be subject to the same requirement.
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where he explicitly criticized the rehabilitation efforts
of Saint Pope John Paul II with the (in)famous words
I have already quoted, to the effect that the Church
was right to condemn Galileo, and would be wrong
to rehabilitate him now, because she was upholding
principles of rationality, morality, and social wellbeing
that are sounder than Galileo’s. And this substantiates
my earlier remark that Feyerabend’s account is apologetic and pro-clerical in one sense, but critical and
anti-clerical in another sense. However, a clarification
about these terms is in order.

tiques, including Feyerabend’s. However, Ratzinger
went on to criticize such views as expressions of skepticism and philosophical insecurity, asserting that “it
would be foolish to construct an impulsive apologetic
on the basis of such views; faith does not grow out of
resentment and skepticism with respect to rationality, but only out of a fundamental affirmation and a
spacious reasonableness … I mention all this only as
a symptomatic case that permits us to see how deep
the self-doubt of the modern age, of science and of
technology goes today” (Ratzinger 1994, 98).

Here, the labels pro-clerical, anti-clerical, apologetic,
pro-Galilean, and anti-Galilean are intended to have
a descriptive, informative, and piecemeal connotation, rather than a loaded, inflammatory, holistic, or
name-calling meaning. Thus, note that I apply these
terms primarily to theses and not to persons, and that
in my account authors often advance views that are
a mixture of such orientations; moreover, pro-clerical
and pro-Galilean are not meant to be opposite. For
example, note that here I am describing Feyerabend’s
account as pro-clerical in one sense, but anti-clerical
in another. The non-invidious and nonloaded character of these terms may also be seen from the fact that
I would have little difficulty describing certain parts
of my own account as pro-clerical, and certain other
parts as pro-Galilean.

On the other hand, there seems to be a very widespread tendency to confuse or conflate Feyerabend’s
view with Ratzinger’s. Some authors (Socci 1993,
62; Sinke Guimarães 2005, 6) have claimed simply
that Cardinal Ratzinger or Pope Benedict XVI accepts
Feyerabend’s view. Other authors (Machamer 2005;
Saka 2006) have gone so far as to attribute this claim
directly to Cardinal Ratzinger or Pope Benedict,
without giving any indication that he was quoting
Feyerabend. There have been some attempts to clarify
the situation (Accattoli 1990, 15; Feyerabend 1993,
133-34 n. 20; Finocchiaro 2008, 274 n. 19), but apparently to no avail.

My main point here is that Feyerabend’s account provides a good illustration of how an ingenious scholar
can formulate an interesting thesis, which is an updated and sophisticated version of the traditional, otherwise discredited, conflictual account.
A second reason for the importance of Feyerabend’s
account is cultural, in the sense of the historical repercussions it has had. In fact, it has become involved
in one of the latest twists to the subsequent Galileo
affair, which brings the story to our own day.
On the one hand, Feyerabend’s apologia was politely
rejected in 1989-1990 by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger,
who at the time was the chairman of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the new name of
the Inquisition); who in 2005 became Pope Benedict
XVI; and who then resigned his position in 2013, thus
becoming “Emeritus” pope. In a scholarly essay, in the
context of an analysis of the role of faith in the revolutionary geopolitical changes happening in 1989-1990,
Cardinal Ratzinger quoted several anti-Galilean criDecember 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 130

				

In fact, in January 2008 such confusion triggered the
following clash (cf. Cini 2007; Anonymous 2008). A
few months earlier, Pope Benedict XVI had accepted
an invitation by the rector of the University of Rome
to deliver the keynote address at the formal ceremony
inaugurating the new academic year. This plan, however, triggered protests by students and faculty, especially in the university’s distinguished department of
physics. They objected primarily on the grounds of the
principle of separation of Church and State, but also
in part because, as they stated, they felt offended and
humiliated by the pope’s view of Galileo’s condemnation, expressed some twenty years earlier when the
pope was still a cardinal; that is, by his sharing Feyerabend’s view. In the light of such opposition, and the
potential for unrest and violence, the pope cancelled
his speech.
This controversy is not helped, but rather exacerbated, by what seems to be a recurrent pattern of thinking or lecturing on the part of Benedict XVI, namely
flirting with equivocation by means of quoting a controversial view. For example, an analogous issue arose
as a result of a lecture he delivered at the University
of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, in which he

quoted a remark made by Byzantine emperor Manuel
II Paleologus in 1391 regarding Islam and holy war
(Ratzinger 2006). Now, given the post-nine-eleven
geopolitical situation, Benedict did make a sustained
effort to clear up the latter misunderstanding. But it
appears that he has made no such effort regarding the
approval of Galileo’s condemnation.
In sum, Feyerabend elaborated an account of the
Galileo affair that is conflictualist, anti-Galilean, and
partly pro-clerical and partly anti-clerical. He interpreted the controversy as rooted in a conflict between
Galileo’s ideal of a value-free natural science, and the
Church’s ideal of a morally and social responsible natural philosophy. And Feyerabend evaluated the two
sides by arguing that the Church was right and Galileo wrong, or at least that she was more nearly right
than he was. In my judgment, Feyerabend’s account is
historically and philosophically untenable. However,
from a methodological or historiographical point of
view, his account represents an ingenious and clever
version of the conflict thesis regarding the problem
of science vs. religion. Moreover, from a cultural point
of view, his account is significant and consequential
insofar as it has become injected and involved into
the latest developments and the highest levels of that
continuing cause célèbre which is the Galileo affair.
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two theses: the main and more explicit thesis is the
prediction that sooner or later the Catholic Church
will canonize Galileo and make him a saint; a corollary and less explicit thesis is an endorsement of such
an action to the effect that the canonization of Galileo would be proper.
These conclusions are no mere afterthought designed
to give the book an interesting and provocative ending. In fact, Heilbron first discussed these ideas in a
book published eleven years earlier, entitled The Sun
in the Church (1999), and subtitled Cathedrals as Solar
Observatories. In the middle of that book, in a chapter
relating the centuries-long story of how the Church
accommodated herself to Copernicus’s doctrine of a
moving earth, there is a section entitled “Galilaeus
Sanctificatus” (Heilbron 1999, 207-11); and this is
essentially an earlier version of the 2010 discussion
that makes up the ending of the Galileo biography.
Moreover, about halfway between these two books,
Heilbron (2005) contributed a chapter to a collective
volume on The Church and Galileo, edited by Ernan
McMullin. In that chapter, entitled “Censorship of
Astronomy in Italy after Galileo,” although Heilbron
does not advance the canonization thesis, or even discuss the issue, he does give a polished, synthetic, and
neutral account of the story; and these historical developments are what provide him with the elements
from which to argue in support of his prediction and
endorsement in his 2010 book. In any case, that book’s
ending does indeed contain a supporting argument,
which is certainly not an afterthought. Let us examine that argument.

Interesting as all this may be, in the present context
I want to focus on something which is presumably
even more intriguing. That is, Feyerabend exemplifies
an unusual but important cognitive attitude, or scholarly approach, which combines a secular perspective
and a clerical focus. However, before describing and
analyzing it further, let me hasten to discuss another To begin with, Heilbron wisely distinguishes two
example.
strands in the history of the subsequent Galileo affair: one pertains to the Church’s attitude toward the
Copernican doctrine of the earth’s motion, which
Heilbron on the Galileo Affair
Heilbron (2010, 358-62) discusses in a section enIn 2010, John Heilbron published a massive and titled “Off the Index”; the other strand involves the
impressive biography of Galileo. Although the oc- condemnation of Galileo the person and the Church’s
casion seems to have been the International Year of attitude toward him, which Heilbron (2010, 362-65)
Astronomy, commemorating the 400th anniversary discusses in a section entitled “On the Rota?”. The asof Galileo’s telescopic discoveries, there is no ques- tronomical-physical part of the story consists of a setion that the book was rooted in Heilbron’s long and ries of small and gradual steps designed to moderate or
distinguished career, during which he has studied al- retract the Church’s opposition to Copernican astronmost every aspect of the history of modern physics omy. That story lasted about two centuries, beginning
and astronomy, from the seventeenth to the twenti- in 1616 when the Congregation of the Index declared
eth century. The book ends with a section discussing the earth’s motion false and contrary to Scripture, and
the prospects for the Galileo affair coming to an end ending in 1835 when Galileo’s Dialogue was taken off
(Heilbron 2010, 358-65). This discussion embodies the Index, after the Congregation of the Inquisition
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had decreed in 1822 that Catholics were free to hold
the theory of the earth’s motion in accordance with
modern astronomy. This may strike one as the dark
story of the commission of a monumental mistake,
followed by a slow and reluctant recognition of the
fact, and by various actions designed to repair the
damage. However, Heilbron manages to find a value
and a positive lesson, as we can see from the following
critical appreciation of ecclesiastic behavior:
The policy of tolerating violations of the law
when enforcement would do more harm than
good, and annulling the law when violation has
become ordinary practice, is often employed in
church and state. A good administrator, like a
good judge, knows when to be implacable and
when to be lenient. Church officials who connived at ways to elude the force of the decrees
against Copernicanism deserve notice and credit. Historians have ignored them because in not
doing their jobs—that is, in not attempting to
enforce a ridiculous and injurious ruling—they
made no noise and because the imputed immobility of the Church over the two hundred years
or so between the condemnation and the reprieve of the Dialogue makes too good and simple a story to ruin with facts. The Roman Catholic Church itself does not claim the wise inaction
of its censors as a contribution to science in Italy.
The Galileo Commission created at the instigation of Pope John Paul II missed an opportunity
to blunt criticism of the Church by noticing officials who found a practical way out of the predicament into which Urban VIII and his Holy
Office had plunged it. [Heilbron 2005, 280]
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363; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 275-94). A number of
Church officials commemorated the event by advancing or publishing views that portrayed Galileo as a
Catholic hero who understood and practiced the very
important doctrine that science and religion are in
harmony because they both derive from God: science
studies the Work of God, religion studies His Word.
They also credited Galileo for his spirit of sacrifice and
piety when at the trial, in deference to unambiguous
Church commands, he abjured his scientific beliefs.
A third milestone occurred on the 400th anniversary
of Galileo’s birth in 1964, during the Second Vatican
Council (Heilbron 2010, 363; cf. Finocchiaro 2005,
326-30). In response to various churchmen’s proposals for a rehabilitation of Galileo, two related actions
were taken. First, the Pontifical Academy of Sciences published an important pro-Galilean biography of
Galileo, written two decades earlier by a clergyman
named Pio Paschini (1964). Second, in the Council’s
constitution Gaudium et spes (approved on 7 December 1965), the Church affirmed explicitly the autonomy of science in general and deplored her wrongful
interference in some cases in the past; and the text
had a footnote mentioning the case of Galileo and
referring the reader to Paschini’s book.
Finally, there was the rehabilitation of Galileo by Pope
John Paul II in the period 1979-1992 (Heilbron 2010,
363-64; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 338-58). Recognizing
the first milestone (of 1893), John Paul was explicit
that Galileo’s hermeneutical principles, unlike those
of his ecclesiastical opponents, were correct, and that
they correspond to those which the Church herself
adopted starting with Leo XIII’s Providentissimus
Deus. Recognizing the second milestone (of 1942),
John Paul reiterated that Galileo was also right about
the harmony between science and religion, and that
this doctrine also corresponds to the one which the
Church herself holds. And John Paul went beyond the
earlier cryptic admission of wrongdoing at the Second Vatican Council (of 1964-65); he was clearer and
more explicit that the condemnation of Galileo had
been not only a mistake, but also been an injustice.

Let us now examine the other strand of the subsequent
Galileo affair, involving the personal condemnation
of Galileo. Heilbron stresses a number of milestones,
as he calls them. The first occurred in 1893, with the
encyclical Providentissimus Deus by Pope Leo XIII
(Heilbron 2010, 362-63; cf. Finocchiaro 2005, 26366). It elaborates a view of the relationship between
scientific investigation and biblical interpretation that
corresponds to the one advocated by Galileo; the authority of Scripture is explicitly limited to questions Heilbron is well aware that this strand of the affair,
of faith and morals, and carries no weight for ques- unlike the strand involving the Copernican theory, is
tions of physical truth and the world of nature.
not over yet. Indeed he is quite realistic about how
long the resolution will take: in his 1999 book, he
The second milestone was occasioned by the tricen- spoke of about 100 years; in his 2010 book, he spoke
tennial of Galileo’s death in 1942 (Heilbron 2010, of about 400 years, a period equivalent to that which
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has already elapsed. Nevertheless, Heilbron suggests
that such rehabilitations of Galileo will continue, until sooner or later they will reach the level of canonization. The key part of his argument amounts to the following steps: describe the milestones just mentioned;
point out that they obviously constitute a trend or
tendency; postulate that the trend will continue; and
thus reach a conclusion about the end result. Moreover, Heilbron’s case for canonization has three subsidiary parts.
One subsidiary part is the accumulation of judgments
and statements about Galileo’s extraordinary and superhuman virtues on the part of his many followers
and admirers, during the past four centuries (Heilbron
2010, 364-65). Then there is the business of his relics:
just as for the case of other saints, various people and
institutions are keen to find, collect, display, and revere various parts of Galileo’s body (Heilbron 2010,
365). Thirdly, Heilbron sees it fit to defend Galileo’s
canonization prospects from a crucial possible objection, involving miracles. Here, Heilbron’s words are
worth quoting:
It might be objected that Galileo performed no
miracles. What then were the miracles of Thomas Aquinas? In fact, Galileo performed a stupendous miracle. He obliterated the ancient distinction between the celestial and terrestrial realms,
raised the earth to the heavens, made the planets
so many earths, and revealed that our moon is
not unique in the universe. Not since the creation
had there been such a refashioning. Then there
was the miracle of himself, a rare combinations
of talents and personalities, who, despite mania
and depression, arthritis, gout, hernias, blindness,
and overindulgence in wine and wit lived to write
three books—the [Sidereal] Messenger, the Dialogue, and the Discourse—any one of which would
have given him enduring fame. [Heilbron 2010,
365]
Heilbron ends his book with the following rhetorical question: “According to Galileo’s mechanics, the
slightest force can move the greatest weight given
sufficient time. The direction of motion is clear. Who
can doubt that within another 400 years the church
will recognize Galileo’s divine gifts, atone for his sufferings, ignore his arrogance, and make him a saint?”
(Heilbron 2010, 365).
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missed. I have tried to reconstruct his argument in a
plausible and sympathetic light. The fact that he gives
such an argument means that it would be irrelevant to
object that he is not serious, and does not really mean
what he says. For even if that were the case, it would
not invalidate the argument and evidence presented.
Nevertheless, I am not sure I share Heilbron’s prediction, and I do not find his argument convincing. The
key weakness is the following.
If we study the milestones of the Church’s rehabilitation efforts described above, they each had a dark,
negative, anti-Galilean side. Leo’s encyclical Providentissimus Deus of 1893 does not even mention
Galileo, let alone credit him with the right hermeneutics. The tricentennial rehabilitation of 1942 included the censorship and non-publication of the biography commissioned to Paschini by the Pontifical
Academy of Sciences, on the grounds that the book
was too pro-Galilean and anti-Jesuitical. The actions
at the Second Vatican Council of 1964-65 included the publication of Paschini’s book in a censored
version, consisting of the deletion or revision of the
more pro-Galilean and anti-Jesuitical passages. John
Paul’s rehabilitation of 1979-1992 included the following paradox spread by the chairman of the Vatican
Commission on Galileo (Cardinal Paul Poupard) and
uncritically accepted by the pope: that although Galileo was right, and his ecclesiastical opponents wrong,
with regard to biblical interpretation and hermeneutical questions, the reverse was the case with regard
to scientific, methodological, and epistemological
questions; Galileo was not aware of the weaknesses of
his pro-Copernican arguments and evidence and of
the epistemological limitations in general of scientific arguments for establishing the truth, whereas Pope
Urban VIII and Cardinal Bellarmine were, and they
attempted without success to enlighten Galileo about
it. This is an old apologetic strategy first elaborated
by Pierre Duhem (1908; 1969), and recently updated
by a German clergyman named Walter Brandmüller
(1982; 1992).

I do not want to give the impression that Heilbron
is unaware that the various rehabilitation milestones
have such anti-Galilean aspects. There is no question
that he knows about them, since his discussion mentions and describes them. However, what I am saying
is that Heilbron does not seem to realize that the existence of this other side in the Church’s rehabilitaI believe that Heilbron’s prediction cannot be dis- tion efforts casts doubt on what we can predict about
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the end result. For this anti-Galilean side amounts to
the existence in this story of another trend opposing
the one on which he focuses and which he wants to
extrapolate into the future. I think both conflicting
trends must be taken into account. If we do that, the
safer and more plausible prediction to make is that in
the next rehabilitation effort something will be done
to credit Galileo in some way and admit some ecclesiastic wrongdoing, but in such a way as to come up
short of a full-fledged Galilean exoneration and clerical retraction, perhaps on account of some previously neglected, or recently updated, or newly invented
Galilean flaw. Extrapolating this pattern onto the final end result 100 or 400 or 1000 years from now, the
chances are that we will have the following outcome.
To echo the words with which Heilbron concludes
his book, “the church will recognize Galileo’s divine
gifts, atone for his suffering, ignore his arrogance”
(Heilbron 2010, 365) but refuse (I say) “to make him a
saint” (Heilbron 2010, 365).
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nineteenth century of the downfall of capitalism. One
could conceptualize this problem by defining a corresponding logical fallacy and exploring general principles for avoiding it, but such logical theorizing and
criticism are beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
Instead, my aim here is to conceptualize Heilbron’s
account (as well as Feyerabend’s) in general methodological terms. To that theme I now turn.

The Berkeley Para-clerical Approach

Recall that, for the case of Feyerabend’s account of
the Galileo affair, I had not only some substantive
criticism, but also some methodological appreciation.
Similarly, for the case of Heilbron’s canonization thesis, I have just articulated a substantive criticism of
its supporting argument. However, this criticism of
Heilbron should not make you forget that I devoted
even more time and space to a sympathetic reconstruction of his position, on the firm belief in the scholarly
originality and cultural importance of his canonizaFor example, the issue of miracles, which Heilbron tion thesis and the canonization issue in general. Still,
tries to pre-empt and defuse, could easily provide such all this is relatively preliminary, and however intera pretext. In fact, miracles are a very serious business esting it may be, it does not yet touch something else
for the Church, and must be conceived in a materi- which is potentially even more important, namely the
al sort of way that involves concrete deliverance from similarities between Feyerabend and Heilbron.
physical ailments afflicting real living persons; they
cannot be conceived as intellectual or mental achieve- To be sure, there are many differences between Feyerments, as Heilbron seems to do. And the case of Saint abend and Heilbron, disciplinary as well as biographThomas Aquinas, which Heilbron attempts to utilize, ical, general as well as particular, formal as well as
confirms this and underscores the difficulties which substantive. For example, Feyerabend is a philosopher,
Galileo’s canonization would have. Aquinas died in Heilbron a historian; also, note that their positions are
1274 and was canonized by Pope John XXII, at Avi- at almost opposite ends of the evaluative spectrum.
gnon, within fifty years (in 1323). As Aquinas’s latest However, here I want to stress the characteristics they
biographer states, the bull of canonization, which “ex- share.
tolled the 300 miracles by the new saint … is not …
explicit on Thomas’s intellectual work” (Torrell 1996, There are at least four things which they seen to
1:321). I conclude that if feats like the Christianiza- have in common. First, they both hail from Berkeley.
tion of Aristotle did not help Aquinas become a saint, Heilbron studied and was trained at the University
it is unlikely that Galileo’s raising the earth to the of California, Berkeley; he taught there from 1967 to
heavens would facilitate his canonization.
1994; he founded and directed its Office for the History of Science and Technology; he served as univerIn a sense, Heilbron’s argument is a typical example sity Vice-Chancellor (of academic affairs) for several
of the pitfalls to which almost everyone is irresistibly years, until he retired; and he has continued his asdrawn in the business of making predictions about the sociation with this institution. As for Feyerabend, he
future based on the existence of demonstrated or de- taught at Berkeley for more than 30 years, even longer
monstrable past tendencies or trends. The pitfalls in- than Heilbron, from 1958 to 1989. Note, in particular,
volve the assumption that the past trends will contin- that they were colleagues for about 22 years.
ue, and the neglect of countervailing trends. The most
spectacular and culturally significant such prediction Second, neither Feyerabend nor Heilbron are Galilewith such pitfalls was Karl Marx’s prediction in the an specialists; that is, Galileo is not their first, main,
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or only scholarly concern. On the contrary, they were
drawn to Galileo by other interests. In Feyerabend’s
case, he began working in the philosophy of physics,
quantum mechanics in particular; then, partly under the influence of Karl Popper, Feyerabend made
some contributions to general methodology. The key
link was provided by the historical approach to the
philosophy of science, that is, the use of the history
of science to formulate and test philosophical claims
about the nature of science, especially the utilization
of significant episodes or great figures such as the Copernican Revolution and Galileo. In Heilbron’s case,
his primary interest may be said to be the history of
physics, modern physics of the past four centuries; his
earlier work dealt with atomic physics in the twentieth century, and with electricity in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Whether or not one accepts
Albert Einstein’s and Stephen Hawking’s judgment
of Galileo as the father of modern physics (Einstein
1954, 271; Hawking 1988, 179), it is not surprising
that a historian of physics with broad interests would
sooner or later develop views about Galileo and find
reasons to write them down. The importance of this
shared trait is that it gives them a perspective on Galilean topics, relatively free of vested interests.
Third, both Feyerabend and Heilbron are master literary stylists, whose prose is anything but prosaic, but
rather full of wit, irony, sarcasm, humor, double entendre, playfulness, and many other figures of speech that
are beyond my own repertoire. This shared characteristic may seem irrelevant, but is important for at least
two reasons. First, they share such a literary and rhetorical dimension with Galileo himself, and so in part
they may have learned it from him and may thereby be
trying to emulate him. Second, such a practice raises
the question of whether what they say can or should
be taken literally or at face value. In Feyerabend’s case,
there are well-known examples when he was pressed
to elaborate and defend his published claims, and responded by saying that he had been playacting, being
an iconoclast and a provocateur. And in Heilbron’s
case, I raised the issue earlier, resolving it by pointing
out that, playacting or not, in his writings on the issue of Galileo’s canonization there is argumentation
and evidence which is real and consequential, even if
introduced in a playacting mode. Still, the rhetorical
dimension of the writing and work of Feyerabend,
Heilbron, and Galileo may lend itself to a twist, as we
shall see later.
December 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 135

				

Science, Religion & Culture

Be that as it may, a more important trait of Feyerabend’s and Heilbron’s accounts of the Galileo affair is the following. Both Feyerabend and Heilbron
are secular-minded scholars, and yet they are keenly
concerned with questions about the relationship between science and religion. Moreover, their writings
on this topic often contain frank advice to the Catholic Church about the conduct of her Galilean affairs.
Furthermore, they often credit the Church, or defend
her, in ways which Catholics themselves, clergymen
or not, would not dare to do. It’s as if Feyerabend
and Heilbron believe that some Catholic affairs are
too important to be left to Catholics themselves. This
sort of attitude and practice takes intellectual courage,
strong self-confidence, analytical subtlety, and experienced judgment.
Such an attitude and approach are clearly reminiscent
of Galileo’s own. In this regard, one revealing remark
is found in a letter Galileo wrote just after the condemnation of Copernicanism in 1616 (cf. Finocchiaro 2014, 108-109). Heilbron mentions it on more
than one occasion, and describes the situation by
saying that “Galileo occasionally referred to himself
as a saint in his self-appointed mission to enlighten the Church” (Heilbron 1999, 211; cf. 2010, 364).
This Galilean saintly self-image is part of Heilbron’s
case for the canonization thesis. However, I take it
as evidence of the approach of secular-minded concern with, and service to, religion and the Church.
Another important occasion when Galileo expressed
his secular-minded concern with religion is in the
classic Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, in which
he defends himself from the clerical criticism that he
is a heretic because he believes in the earth’s motion,
which contradicts Scripture. In the introductory part
of this essay, he gives some background information
and makes a number of clarifications. One of these
is the following contrast between the attitude of his
enemies and his own:
They always shield themselves with a simulated
religious zeal, and they also try to involve Holy
Scripture and to make it somehow subservient
to their insincere objectives; against the intention
of Scripture and of the Holy Fathers (if I am not
mistaken), they want to extend, not to say abuse,
its authority, so that even for purely physical conclusions which are not matters of faith one must
totally abandon the senses and demonstrative arguments in favor of any scriptural passage whose

apparent words may contain a different indication. Here I hope to demonstrate that I proceed
with much more pious and religious zeal than
they when I propose not that this book [Copernicus’s Revolutions] should not be condemned,
but that it should not be condemned without
understanding, examining, or even seeing it, as
they would like. [Galilei 2008, 113-14]
This approach which I have extracted from Feyerabend and Heilbron, and which I have also attributed
to Galileo, has more cultural resonance and presence
than it may appear at first. I believe it corresponds
to the fundamental inspiration, motivation, and aim
of the International Society for Science and Religion,
the scholars associated with it, and the works that represent it. Here, as supporting evidence I would cite a
book entitled A Companion to the ISSR Library of Science and Religion, edited by Pranab Das (2011), consisting of reviews of 224 books on the topic.
Furthermore, despite the indisputable Berkeley connection, it goes without saying that many scholars
not associated with Berkeley practice such a methodological approach. In this regard, I would mention
Agassi (1971), Blackwell (1991; 1998a; 1998b; 2006),
DiCanzio (1996), Fantoli (2003; 2012), Pera (1998),
and Segre (1997; 1998), just to limit myself to good
examples from the field of Galilean studies, which I
know best.5
On the other hand, I would not say that this approach
constitutes a school. For I do not think that the number of practitioners is sufficiently large or that their
critical mass is great enough; nor has their self-reflective awareness and articulation of the approach
reached a sufficient degree of explicitness; and the
same applies to the degree of scholarly and academic
organization. In this regard, I would contrast this situation with the historical approach to the philosophy
of science, which does seem to have all the requisites
to be a school.
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Nevertheless, the Berkeley connection cannot be dismissed lightly, for it cannot be a fortuitous coincidence that another distinguished practitioner of this
approach holds a history Ph.D. from there, namely
Ronald Numbers (1993; 2009; cf. Das 2011, 13336). Numbers, who was awarded the Sarton Medal
in 2008, studies the history of scientific creationism,
and manages to follow a secular-minded approach on
questions about the relationship between evolutionary biology and biblical creationism. More generally,
he conceived the project of bringing together scholars who have contributed to dispelling myths about
science and religion, from the ancient Greeks to the
twenty-first century; and then he edited a collection
of resulting essays under the title Galileo Goes to Jail
and Other Myths about Science and Religion. Numbers’s
concluding words in the book’s introduction give a
good flavor of the approach I am trying to articulate:
The contributors to this volume have no obvious
scientific or theological axes to grind. Nearly half,
twelve of twenty-five, self-identify as agnostic or
atheist (that is, unbelievers in religion). Among
the remaining thirteen there are five mainstream
Protestants, two evangelical Protestants, one Roman Catholic, one Jew, one Muslim, one Buddhist—and two whose beliefs fit no conventional
category (including one pious Spinozist). Over
half of the unbelievers, including me, grew up in
devout Christian homes—some as fundamentalists or evangelicals—but subsequently lost their
faith. I am not sure exactly what to make of this
fact, but I suspect it tells us something about why
we care so much about setting the record straight.
[Numbers 2009, 6-7]

What I would add is that we are dealing with a cognitive phenomenon important enough to deserve
a name. Partly echoing Numbers, and retaining the
Berkeley connection, we could call this approach and
these scholars “Berkeley clerical fact-checkers.” But
such emphasis on setting the record straight and fact
checking strikes me as too naïve, uncritical, or posiSimilarly, it should be added that many Berkeley tivistic. Perhaps we could label it the “Berkeley clerischolars have done excellent work on the interaction cal pundit syndrome”; but the term syndrome would
between science and religion, but do not practice this carry too negative a connotation. A more positive demethodological approach; and this applies even to scription would be “Berkeley clerical rescue service”;
some outstanding Galileo scholars, such as Biagioli but that is perhaps too positive and somewhat crass. I
(1993; 2006). My point is that this approach, impor- think it may be best to drop all the terms introducing
tant and fruitful as I believe it is, has no monopoly on extra or extraneous connotations, and retain the bare
truth and goodness.
essentials. Perhaps that would be accomplished by
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calling it simply the “Berkeley para-clerical” approach. are talking about committed and critical impartiality
or judiciousness.
At this point someone might object to my label by
suggesting that the word Berkeley be replaced by the Such clarifications are useful partly because some of
word Galilean or by the term Feyerabendian-Heilbro- Ron Numbers’s self-reflections explicitly bring out
nian, or be dropped altogether. However, this seman- such a perspective. To begin with, Numbers’s choice
tical question is relatively unimportant, and I shall not of topic is precisely what one would expect from such
pursue it here. It is more important to try to describe impartiality or judiciousness. Referring to his history
and analyze this approach more clearly, more precise- of scientific creationism, Numbers insightfully says:
“In writing this history, I have chosen to concentrate
ly, and more deeply, to which I now turn.
on those creationists who possessed, or claimed to
Numbers’s Version of the
possess, scientific credentials. This might strike some
readers as an odd choice of topic for a historian of
Para-clerical Approach
science, but I would submit that one of the best ways
In the context of the Galileo affair, and more general- to learn about the history of ‘science’ is to explore
ly the interaction between science and religion, I have how interested parties have contested its boundaries.
illustrated and introduced what I call the Berkeley pa- Many books in recent years have sought to discredra-clerical approach. So far I have characterized this it creationism scientifically or theologically, but only
approach in terms of being secular-minded, offering a few have examined the movement historically …”
advice to the Church, crediting the Church for un- (Numbers 1993, p. xiv).
common reasons, defending the Church from common criticism, believing in the superiority of religious Here, Numbers is using one connotation of the term
outsiders over insiders, and intellectual courage. These historical to clarify his own approach. According to this
connotation, to be historical is to be objective. In turn,
traits require some elaboration.
objectivity does not mean being merely descriptive
Let us focus on just two things. First, although the and avoiding evaluation altogether, which is impossiterm secularism can be given various nuances of mean- ble and self-defeating when the topic is a contested or
ing, I believe a common core of all is the connotation controversial one. Rather, in such contexts, objectivity
of some kind of “indifference to or rejection or exclu- means being accurate in one’s descriptions and fair in
sion of religion and religious considerations.”6 Having one’s evaluations. And fairness in turn means avoiding
said this, the next question that immediately arises for one-sidedness and taking all sides properly into acthe analyst is: what exactly are indifference, rejection, count, although of course this is not a mechanical task
and exclusion. Still, to have said this is not totally that can be reduced to following simple and precise
opaque or unhelpful. Secondly, to believe or act as if rules, such as splitting the difference between the opChurch affairs and history are too important to be left posite sides; rather, it involves essentially the exercise
to churchmen or religious believers, whatever else it of judgment.
may imply, certainly implies that on such topics the
secular or nonreligious investigator has an advantage Next, one of the major theses which Numbers elaborates may be regarded as an illustration of the paover an investigator who is a religious believer.
ra-clerical approach. This thesis is a substantive claim
Thus, here we have two specific attitudes that are an- about the history of scientific creationism, and it asti-clerical, in the sense of being critical of or opposed serts, in his own words:
to the Church. On the other hand, in the Berkeley
Rather than finding clerics arrayed in simple
para-clerical approach, one displays such an attitude
opposition to scientists, we discover conflicts
in order to perform a service to the Church by offerof a different sort: psychological, as creationists
ing useful advice, giving her due credit, and defending
struggled to reconcile the apparently conflicting
her from unfair criticism; and here we have three disclaims of science and Scripture; and social, as
tinct pro-clerical attitudes. I believe that in so doing
they quarreled with one another over competing
the para-clerical scholar is trying to properly combine
scientific and biblical interpretations or contestthe pros and the cons, in the belief that the topic is
ed the boundaries of science and religion with
so important that one must avoid being one-sided or
evolutionists in courthouses, legislative halls, and
going too far along any one side. In other words, we
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school-board rooms. In virtually every public
battle, even when creationists squared off against
evolutionists, scientists and preachers could be
found on both sides, and sometimes in unexpected numbers. For example, … the Arkansas
creation-evolution trial of 1981 … prompted the
Protestant theologian Langdon Gilkey … to observe that the only “warfare” in Little Rock found
“liberal religion and liberal science on the one
side, and absolutist religion and its appropriate
‘science’ on the other.” [Numbers 1993, pp. xivxv]
Finally, Numbers’s criticism of alternative approaches
adds another variation on the same theme:
For too long now students of science and religion have tended to grant the former a privileged
position, often writing more as partisans than
historians and grading religious “beliefs” by how
much they encouraged or retarded the growth of
scientific “knowledge.” Recently we have heard
persuasive calls for a more even-handed treatment. But even academics who would have no
trouble empathetically studying fifteenth-century astrology, seventeenth-century alchemy, and
nineteenth-century phrenology seem to lose
their nerve when they approach twentieth-century creationism and its fundamentalist proponents … In other words, although many scholars
seem to have no trouble respecting the unconventional beliefs and behaviors of peoples chronologically and geographically removed from us,
they substitute condemnation for comprehension when scrutinizing their own neighbors. I
think it is profitable to get acquainted with the
neighbors, especially so if we find them so threatening. [Numbers 1993, pp. xvi-xvii]
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the inaugural volume of the California Studies in the
History of Science. This book is a collection of the
most important documents pertaining to the trial and
condemnation of Galileo from 1613 to 1633. Here is
how he summarizes the approach he is advocating,
at the end of a methodological and historiographical
discussion in the Introduction:
To summarize, a balanced approach to the study
of the Galileo affair must avoid the two opposite
extremes exemplified by the anti-Galilean and
the anti-Catholic interpretations. There is no
easy way of doing this, but it may help to distinguish scientific from epistemological issues, factual correctness from rational correctness, essential correctness from total correctness, the several
epistemological issues from each other, intellectual from external factors, and the several external factors from each other (personal, psychological, social, economic, and political). However …
these distinct entities are also interrelated, so the
point is not to deny their interaction, but to make
sure they are not confused with one another.7

Let me add here the usual caveat about theory vs. practice; that is, more important than saying such things
and expressing such self-reflective pronouncements is
to actually do them and to put them into practice in
one’s investigations. Indeed, just as Numbers practices
in the course of his investigation what he preaches in
the pronouncements quoted earlier, so does this other
scholar. This is evident from the reactions of readers,
who easily recognize that the book does follow this
approach. One such reader is a distinguished outsider,
legal scholar Alan Dershowitz, who writes: “The Galileo Affair should be required reading for everyone who
values freedom and fears censorship. The extraordinary virtue of this collection of documents … is that
it presents both sides of the dispute. ‘Both sides?’ you
Here, Numbers uses the notions of “non-partisanship” are probably thinking. Is there really a procensorship
and “even-handedness” as two additions to that family side of this particular debate that is worth reading?
of terms which I have been extracting: impartiality, In answering that question, it must be recalled that at
the time Galileo published his arguments, there was
judiciousness, objectivity, and judgment calls.
no dispositive empirical evidence that he was correct”
It seems to me that Numbers’s self-reflective pro- (Dershowitz 1991).
nouncements are not only important in themselves,
but also revealing with regard to the para-clerical ap- Finally, besides the methodological similarity (at both
proach. In fact, such self-reflections may be usefully the reflective and practical levels) between Numbers
compared to those we find in a work which was pro- and this other Berkeley graduate, it is simply uncanduced by another Berkeley Ph.D., and which was pub- ny to find another similarity with regard to a main
lished in 1989 by the University of California Press as substantive thesis that illustrates the approach. I am
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referring to Numbers’s thesis (mentioned above) that,
in the history of the creation vs. evolution controversy,
the real conflict has been not between science and religion, but between liberal science and religion on one
side and absolutist science and religion on the other.
Here is what this other author has written regarding
this topic: “Because the Galileo Affair involved a conflict between one of the founders of modern science
and one of the world’s great religious institutions, it
has traditionally been taken as an example of the warfare between science and religion … [However] even
a cursory reading of the relevant documents shows
that many churchmen were on his side and many scientists were on the opposite side; thus, there was a
split within both science and religion, along the lines
of what may be called conservation and innovation;
so the real conflict was between a conservative and a
progressive attitude.” 8
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and Heilbron’s accounts may be taken to show this.
Indeed infallibility is one of those religious doctrines
toward which the para-clericals can only show indifference, rejection, or exclusion, to echo the canonical
dictionary definition of secularism quoted above.

Finally, some personal clarifications and qualifications
are in order. First, it is obvious that the fourth scholar
cited above is the present writer; thus, the references and quotations given above are offered as evidence
that I do indeed practice the para-clerical approach.
Moreover, there is no doubt that I learned this approach at Berkeley; that is, in part from Feyerabend
and Heilbron, who were my teachers and dissertation
advisors. Additionally, my doctoral dissertation was
not on Galileo, but on the historiography of science,
in the sense of the philosophy and methodology of the
history of science (Finocchiaro 1973); like them, only
later was I drawn to Galileo, partly because one of my
historiographical case studies was Alexandre Koyré’s
Conclusion
work on Galileo, and that led me to learn more about
I have been arguing that the methodological self-re- Galileo. However, another reason for my attraction to
flections of Numbers and this other scholar not only Galileo was that I felt he could serve as a good model
correspond to each other in tone and content, but to emulate in the search for the truth and acquisition
also correspond to the methodological practices of of knowledge; and of course, the emulation could only
Feyerabend and Heilbron in their accounts of the be judicious and critical, and not mechanical or blind.
Galileo affair. Those self-reflections correspond to
one another insofar as they both stress notions such On the other hand, recall that, as presented above, the
as impartiality, judiciousness, objectivity, non-parti- Berkeley para-clerical approach includes (as a minor
sanship, even-handedness, and balanced judgment component) the literary style and rhetorical flourish
in the handling of controversial topics such as the which Feyerabend and Heilbron, and indeed Galileo,
Galileo affair, creation vs. evolution, and science vs. like to use and display. And in this regard, for better
religion in general. And they correspond to the Feyer- or worse, I am not sure I have yet mastered, or ever
abend-Heilbron approach to the Galileo affair, which learned, this Feyerabendian-Heilbronian style and
attempts to combine a generally secular and clerically rhetoric, especially the double-entendre and playfulexternal perspective with a concern to help, appreci- ness. In any case, even if I had, I might not want to
use or display it on the present occasion. Thus, I hope
ate, and defend the Church when appropriate.
readers will resist the temptation to misinterpret my
I have named this the Berkeley para-clerical approach, rhetoric of Berkeley para-clericalism; they should not
because it has been pioneered by these Berkeley pro- just dismiss it, or take it as mere rhetoric; but also they
fessors and graduates. However, I have indicated that should not take that rhetoric more seriously than the
it is much more widespread than such a label might substance of how this approach actually studies the
suggest. For example, I have argued that it is reminis- relationship between Galileo and the Church, creacent of the approach which Galileo himself followed tionism and evolutionism, and more generally science
in matters of science vs. religion. I have also point- and religion. In short, readers should be even-handed
ed out that this approach is practiced by a number and impartial in their analysis of my rhetoric.
of non-Berkeley scholars. And I have suggested that
this approach is important and fruitful, and deserves Acknowledgments
even greater adoption. At the same time I have made
it clear that this approach, like any other, is not in- A shorter version of this essay was presented as a colfallible; and my substantive criticism of Feyerabend’s loquium talk at the Center for Science, Technology,
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Medicine, and Society (CSTMS), at the University of
California, Berkeley, on 21 February 2013. For such
an opportunity, I am grateful to its director, Massimo
Mazzotti; and for incisive and helpful comments during the discussion period, I thank Mario Biagioli, who
was in the audience there. An even briefer version of
this basic idea was mentioned as an appendix to the
paper I presented at the conference on “The Enlightenment Pope: Benedict XIV (1675-1758),” in May
2012, at Washington University in St. Louis and St.
Louis University; I appreciate the feedback received
there from John Heilbron, who was a conference participant, and from Phil Gavitt, who was one of the
organizers. I also gratefully acknowledge comments
received from Ron Numbers and Albert DiCanzio.
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Endnotes
[1] For more details, see, e.g., Beltrán Marí 2006,
Blackwell (1991; 1998a; 1998b; 2006), Bucciantini
(1995; 2003), Camerota 2005, Fantoli (2003; 2012),
Finocchiaro (1980; 1989; 2005; 2010; 2013; 2014;
2015), Heilbron (1999; 2010), Mayer 2015, and
Speller 2008.
[2] For details about Galileo’s non-imprisonment, see
Finocchiaro 2009.
[3] The quotation marks around this word are meant
as scare quotes, for it is unclear whether there really
was a rehabilitation, and if so what kind and to what
extent. This will become apparent in the discussion
below, where I will usually speak of rehabilitation efforts, although I will avoid the pedantry of constantly
using the scare quotes. On this issue, besides the references given below, see also Segre 1999.
[4] For some good examples of the voluminous literature on this problem, see Brooke 1991, Brooke and
Cantor 1998, Das 2011, Finocchiaro (2010, 291-314;
2012, 14-25; 2013, 311-14), Lindberg and Numbers
(1986; 1987; 2003), and Numbers 2009.
[5] It should be noted that a high proportion of such
scholars (namely, Feyerabend, Agassi, Pera, and Segre) seem to be followers of Karl Popper, in one fashion or another. This fact may be significant, and there
may indeed be an important connection between a
Popperian orientation and the para-clerical approach.
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This topic deserves further study and reflection, but is
obviously beyond the scope of the present investigation.
[6] Merriam-Webster Dictionary online, at: <http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secularism>,
consulted on 30 December 2014.
[7] Finocchiaro 1989, 10.
[8] Finocchiaro 1997, 3; cf 2005, 3-4; 2010, pp. xxixxxx; 2012, 22-24; 2013, 311-14.

